Afghanistan, once viewed as a success story for
America's post 9/11 foreign policy, is slipping back into the hands of the
Taliban. The Taliban controls parts of southern and eastern Afghanistan,
and it is recruiting new members and buying more arms every passing day.
Worse, many Afghanis are growing disillusioned with their government and its
Western allies. There are several reasons for these developments - not
least of which is America's side-lining of the situation in Afghanistan while it
concentrates on Iraq - but one crucial element behind Afghanistan's problems is
the opium trade.
After the Taliban was defeated by the Northern Alliance
and its Western allies (chief among them the U.S.), many of the members of
Afghanistan's new government began making large profits off of the opium
business. In the interest of securing peace, finding members of Al Qaeda,
and helping to rebuild Afghanistan, the U.S. choose to turn a blind eye as
Afghanis began planting poppy seeds.
Unfortunately, the opium trade has
taken off, and it now accounts for a significant percentage of Afghanistan's
economy (its economic effects are roughly equivalent to one half of the
legitimate Afghani economy). This has not gone unnoticed by members of the
government - who now demand bribes for protecting opium farmers and traders from
the law. Nor has it gone unnoticed by the Taliban, who tax opium farmers
and traders to fund their war, and who use opium smuggling routes to smuggle
weapons into Afghanistan.
The U.S. and its allies have finally
woken up to the dangers of the opium trade, but their efforts to combat it have
only made matters worse. They can't do much about the corrupt government
officials who profit off of the trade because each official is protected by
another corrupt official. Likewise, they can't destroy most poppy fields
because most farmers have bought protection from government officials.
When the Afghani government does allow anti-drug agents to destroy a field, it's
generally in response to a personal vendetta, not as the result of a
commitment to fighting the drug trade. This situation harms the legitimacy
of the Afghani government and its Western allies in the eyes of the Afghani
people (who already have too much experience being misruled by corrupt officials).
Furthermore, in Taliban controlled areas, local farmers obtain protection from
the Taliban - which provides the Taliban with both money and support.
Finally, when the U.S. manages to destroy a poppy field or interdict a drug
shipment, it does so at the cost of someone's livelihood - thus creating more
Taliban sympathizers.
The New York Times recently ran a story about the U.S.
shipping Columbian anti-drug agents to Afghanistan to teach Afghani security
forces how to fight drug-trafficking. The story suggested that America's
goal was for Afghanistan for it to become more like
Columbia. Unfortunately, armed rebellion, funded by the drug trade, has persisted
in Columbia for several decades now, and it doesn't appear likely to end
anytime soon. A similar outcome in Afghanistan would mean a weak state
constantly riven by violence and permanently threatened by rebellion. The Taliban
would be well-funded and capable of attacking both the Afghani government and
supporting terrorism in the West. Furthermore, the drug flow would
continue out of Afghanistan largely unabated.
To prevent such an
outcome, I propose that the U.S. work with the Afghani government to create a
legal program for buying opium at a premium price.
If Afghani farmers could legally grow and sell opium to the U.S. at top-notch
prices, then there would be no need to pay protection money - thus drastically
reducing corruption in the Afghani government and defunding the Taliban.
The U.S. could eat the cost (a small one compared to losing Afghanistan to the
Taliban) and destroy the opium, or it could secretly sell it (Iran-Contra shows
that it wouldn't be the first time the U.S. government has been involved in the
drug trade), or, most appropriately, it could sell it to drug companies to
distill compounds for their medicinal use. Alternatively, the U.S. could
prop up the price on another crop, so that Afghani farmers would grow it instead
of opium - although that would raise the problem of preventing that crop from
being smuggled into the country.
Given the rampant corruption
in the Afghani government, and our inability to control the drug trade even in
the best of circumstances (i.e. Columbia, where we have tried for decades,
or in the in the U.S., where billions of dollars have failed to achieve
victory in the war on drugs), we cannot hope to end the drug trade in
Afghanistan. We can, however, choose to stop letting our enemies grow
strong by profiting on it. We should set up a system of economic
incentives that encourage Afghanis to support us, rather than the Taliban.
Buying opium might be the most effective way to do that.
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